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Abstract 
 
This paper is an examination of the threat of global terrorism and the associated challenges 
and opportunities in determining the most viable risk management solutions.  Terrorism risk 
poses unprecedented challenges - conceptual, technical, and operational - for the insurance 
industry.  The effects of terrorist events can be enduring, incurring virtually limitless costs 
and consequences to the economy.  Through analysis of the nature of terrorism risk, issues 
with insurability become apparent.  Despite offering coverage for such events, insurers face 
difficulties in measuring and quantifying terrorism risk to underwrite it profitably.  With the 
current political environment, the uncertainty of the government’s role is a concern for 
insurers, risk managers, and lawmakers.   The future of managing terrorism risk is reliant on 
the industry adopting a solution that is not only feasible in implementation, but also 
economically sustainable. 
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I. Introduction to Terrorism Risk 
   a.  Terrorism Risk Management 
 The risk management process is used to minimize the adverse effects of loss 
exposures and involves the sequence of five steps:  1) identifying and analyzing exposures to 
loss, 2) examining feasible alternative risk management techniques to handle exposures, 3) 
selecting the most appropriate risk management techniques to handle exposures, 4) 
implementing the chosen techniques, and 5) monitoring the results (“Risk Management 
Process”).  Corporations and other organizations use this systematic approach of managing 
risk to ensure proper measures are being used to lower the total cost of risk.  From an 
industry perspective, the risk management process is essential in understanding the 
challenges that the government and insurers face as well as opportunities regarding 
alternative risk transfer methods and financing techniques. 
The insurance industry faces significant challenges with terrorism risk in three areas:  
conceptual, technical, and operational.  Conceptual challenges include identification and 
analysis, technical challenges include quantification and assessment, and operational 
challenges relate to monitoring the results of the implemented risk management techniques.  
An in-depth analysis of these challenges can help identify if the current techniques in place 
are appropriate and if changes should be implemented.  A conceptual understanding of 
terrorism risk and the inherent loss exposures is necessary.  Although there may be numerous 
definitions of terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines it as “the unlawful use of 
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives” 
(What We Investigate, 2010).  While it is the duty of the government to mitigate terrorist 
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threats, insurers must be able to understand the risk to be able to effectively analyze the loss 
exposures and underwrite the risk profitably.   
  
   b.  Economic Impact 
 Terrorism risk and its impact on the global economy must be understood to identify 
the true costs.  The macroeconomic effects of such disasters can be immense and have both 
direct and indirect economic costs.  Direct costs are often shorter in nature while the indirect 
costs can have a greater impact for years to come.  Acts of terrorism can have severe 
economic consequences “by diverting foreign direct investment, destroying infrastructure, 
redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade” (Sandler and Enders, 
2004).  The substantive consequences require the industry to respond in a manner that 
reduces the overall impact to the economy. 
Direct impacts including fatalities, injuries, damage to property, and losses to 
infrastructures can result in immediate disruptions to the economy.  Businesses are often 
unable to adapt to these changing circumstances and recover to pre-loss conditions.  Using 
real-time forecasting, a study looking at certain variables in relation to the events of 
September 11, 2001, found that, “the immediate impact was to reduce real GDP growth in 
2001 by 0.5%, and to increase the unemployment rate by 0.11% (reduce employment by 
598,000 jobs)” (Roberts, 2009).  
Terrorism also affects the economy in four ways: “1) it adversely affects the capital 
stock (i.e. human and physical) of the country, 2) terrorist threat induces higher levels of 
uncertainty, 3) it promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing resources 
from productive sectors for use in security, and 4) it is known to affect negatively specific 
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industries such as aviation, insurance, tourism, etc.” (Srujan).  In addition to the direct losses 
from terrorist events, levels of uncertainty can have a significant impact on financial markets, 
commodities, and currencies.  With the allocation of resources by the government to thwart 
terrorist attacks, issues can arise; funds that would have been used to improve the overall 
economy are then being used for counter-terrorism operations.  Additionally, sectors 
including cruise lines, entertainment, automobiles, and restaurants can all be impacted with a 
reduction in consumer spending.  Due to the presence and sheer impact of terrorist events on 
the global economy, methods to address the risk at hand must be considered in full to 
determine the most viable solutions the industry can reasonably implement and maintain. 
 
    c.  Industry Response 
The magnitude of terrorism risk’s impact became a reality on September 11, 2001.  
This pivotal point in history altered the perception of terrorism and changed the way in which 
it is assessed, evaluated, and treated with respect to insurance mechanisms.  Created in 
response to this event, “the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) filled a critical financial 
void at a time of great national uncertainty and helped ensure an orderly financial recovery in 
the event of future events” (“TRIA Backgrounder”, 2013).  Essentially, TRIA required all 
property and casualty insurers to provide terrorism coverage for commercial policyholders.  
In return, the federal government would act as a reinsurer, agreeing to reimburse carriers for 
losses up to a hard cap of $100 billion.   
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The stated purpose of TRIA is as follows: 
“To establish a temporary Federal program that provides for a transparent system of 
shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of terrorism, 
in order to- 
1.     protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the 
continued widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty 
insurance for terrorism risk; and 
2.     allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, 
resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses, 
while preserving State insurance regulation and consumer protections” (Roberts, 
2004). 
This fundamental purpose of TRIA has created additional challenges for insurers despite its 
intentions to act as a federal backstop and provide a safety net to prevent insurers from 
becoming insolvent after a catastrophic terrorist event. 
 One constraint through the creation of TRIA is the role of government intervention 
and restrictions to take over the market.  Various standpoints can be used in determining how 
to properly address the risk, depending on a corporation’s structure.  However, the first step 
is to understand the stipulations inherent to TRIA, including thresholds and other 
requirements.  For example, insurer deductibles are set at twenty percent of premiums – the 
amount that must be paid before federal assistance is provided.  Additionally, there are 
certain requirements that must be met in order for coverage to apply with regards to certified 
acts of terrorism.   
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“Only certified acts are eligible for coverage through TRIA. An event can be certified if the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the United 
States determine the act meets all the following criteria: 
• It is considered an act of terrorism. 
• It is violent or dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure. 
• It results in damage within the United States, (including US air carriers, vessels, 
and/or US missions, as described in the Act). 
• It is committed by an individual or individuals, as part of an effort to coerce the US 
civilian population or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the US 
government by coercion.” (“Certifying Events Under”). 
Having been recently extended to 2020, the Terrorism Risk & Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2007 provides a level of security to the insurance industry.  However, 
much debate has occurred questioning if this will serve as a temporary fix or a permanent 
solution to the problem.  Given TRIPRA’s stipulations, insurers must understand how to 
properly identify, analyze, and measure the risk.  While this and other issues create 
challenges for insurers in the underwriting process, opportunities for the private sector may 
exist in the future, depending on the industry’s direction. 
 
II. Insurer Challenges 
    a.  Hazard Identification 
 The first phase in the risk management process poses additional challenges to insurers 
and the government to identify and analyze the threat of terrorist organizations.  
Understanding where terrorism risk exists and the hazards involved are essential to 
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understand prior to beginning the quantification and assessment stages.  “Terrorism risk only 
exists when a person or group has the capability and intent to present a threat of attack on a 
vulnerable target in a manner which would have consequences of concern to citizens of the 
United States” (Willis, 2008).  When utilizing hazard identification, insurers must use an 
approach that encompasses an in-depth look at historical occurrences, current threats, and 
emerging threats.  Additionally, understanding terrorist organizations in light of the true 
threat level is crucial.  Lastly, it is critical that the influence of risk perception is not 
substantial enough that it alters the true impact of terrorist threats in the following steps to 
measure and quantify the risk. 
  Historical terrorist events can provide insight into the frequency of such occurrences 
as well as the severity of losses.  Terrorist events have been extremely costly over the years, 
with millions in property damage and many fatalities.  The following chart illustrates the 
impact that past events have had: 
 
Over the past few decades, the terrorism landscape has evolved in a number of ways.  
With growing threats from organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab, global terrorism 
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risk is imminent.  RAND, a world leader in research on terrorism, published a study stating, 
“terrorism remains a real-albeit uncertain-national security threat, with the most likely 
scenarios involving arson or explosives being used to damage property or conventional 
explosives or firearms used to kill and injure civilians” (Hartwig and Wilkinson, 2014).  
Terrorist organizations will often use threats in an attempt to create fear among the public 
through use of weapons of mass destruction, including incendiary, chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear agents.  Additionally, hazards can vary greatly from conventional 
bombs, armed attacks, and assaults on infrastructures and information systems.  
While common terrorist hazards must be identified, it is even more crucial to identify 
new and emerging trends.  One such trend that is perhaps the biggest threat in the real of 
terrorism is cyber-terrorism.  The Central Intelligence Agency has identified this threat as the 
battleground for the future regarding terrorist hazards.  James Clapper, U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence, recently stated in a hearing that cyber attacks, allegedly by North 
Korean and Iranian groups, “against us are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and 
severity of impact” (Paletta, 2015).  These highly targeted events use Internet attacks in the 
attempt to disrupt networks on a large-scale.  Cyber-terrorism and other emerging trends 
must be identified for insurers to begin the analysis process.  
The role of social media and other similar technological platforms must be identified 
as an emerging threat with terrorist organizations.  With the ubiquitous nature of social 
media, extremists have the ability to recruit new members and exchange information much 
more rapidly than ever before.  Governments must use resources to identify threats, 
monitoring areas of political turmoil and assessing the hazards that may be involved in 
possible terrorist events (“Tensions Building,” 2012). 
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 Regarding risk perception, insurers and governments must be careful to separate the 
concept of risk with hazard identification.  “The concept of risk is a psychological one.  Risk, 
as opposed to danger, is a socially constructed phenomenon.  Riskiness is based on 
perception rather than fact, and this perception is based on qualitative, not qualitative 
characteristics of the hazard being considered” (Jenkin, 2006).  While there are attributes to 
risk such as probability and voluntariness, it is important to understand that no single 
attribute defines the risk of a particular hazard.  This being said, the influence of risk 
perception, especially with regards to political or terrorism risk, should be taken into 
consideration when identifying the threats of hazards in the identification process.  By doing 
so, governments and insurers will be better prepared to fully assess the likelihood of terrorist 
threats without placing a significant emphasis on risk perception. 
 
    b.  Analysis 
 Through the analysis stage, terrorism risk can be viewed to identify the key 
determinants in properly assessing the risk as well as looking at the issue of insurability.  The 
three primary determinants in assessing terrorism risk include: 1) threat, 2) vulnerability, and 
3) consequences. “Terrorism risk indicates the expected consequences of attacks considering 
the possibility of the occurrence and success of the terrorist attacks.  In terms of probability, a 
terrorism risk from an attack of a certain type is the unconditional expected value of damages 
of a certain type” (Srujan).  While this may seem like a simple process, the reality of 
understanding this risk in full is a difficult task.   
Despite the requirements for insurers to provide coverage for terrorism, an analysis to 
determine insurability can be made to understand if the current system is economically 
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sustainable.  Alfred Manes described insurance as follows:  “insurance is the mutual cover of 
a fortuitous, assessable need of a large number of similarly exposed businesses” (Thomas, 
2005).  Not only is this necessary in understanding the nature of the risk itself, but also in 
understanding the options available as it pertains to the quantification of the risk.     
Certain conditions should be true in order for insurance to work as a method of risk 
sharing.  To determine insurability of a risk, there are four basic requirements: 1) estimable 
frequency, 2) estimable severity, 3) diversifiable risk, and 4) random loss distribution 
(Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky, Abate, and Webb, 2013).  Terrorism risk can be 
classified as systemic in nature because it is non-diversifiable, difficult to predict, and 
impossible to completely avoid.  This violation of the technical definition of an “insurable” 
risk creates many challenges for insurers. Since there are very few data points regarding the 
frequency with which terrorist attacks occur, it is nearly impossible to use models to estimate 
their likelihood with any actuarial credibility.  Additionally, it is difficult to model the 
possible losses an insurer could sustain due to the magnitude of losses.  Terrorism risk is 
likely to be highly concentrated in a geographic area, within an industry, or within a certain 
time span.  Finally, insurability requires losses to be random or fortuitous.  Terrorism events 
are planned and coordinated events, violating the need for randomness in nature. 
 A comparison to catastrophic risks such as natural disasters has been made, but there 
are several key differences and factors which include:  “availability of historical data, 
dynamic uncertainty, shifting attention to unprotected targets, existence of negative 
externalities and government influencing the risk” (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004).  
The first difference is a primary issue in the quantification phase of the risk management 
process in that there is a severe lack of historical data available for use, primarily due to 
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national security reasons.  One way in which terrorism is analyzed is through rates.  
However, issues arise in that base rates for terrorist losses are significantly lower than those 
related to, for example, homicide or deaths as a result of cardiovascular disease.  Assessing 
other risks for insurance purposes are less difficult due to this and other reasons.   
Dynamic uncertainty involves the issues of a combination or mix of strategies and 
counterstrategies used in a terrorist attack.  These are very difficult to accurately analyze.  
Through these strategies, terrorists will often respond to security measures by shifting their 
attention to more vulnerable targets.  Negative externalities such as information sharing and 
interdependent security are also factors.  Perhaps the most differentiating factor is the role 
that government has in attempts to mitigate threats and thwart potential disasters.  All of 
these factors must be included in the analysis and pose issues from an insurability standpoint. 
Before beginning the modeling process, insurers must understand the government’s 
initiatives to prevent terrorist attacks.  This can pose issues in the quantification and 
measurement of terrorism risk.  While an approach can be made similar to that used in 
catastrophe modeling, the quantification of counter-terrorism operations are nearly 
impossible.  In addition to the coverage provided under TRIA’s enactment through the 
partnership of private insurers and the government, methods exist through loss control and 
preventative measures.  The government has the duty to identify, analyze, measure, and treat 
the risk of terrorism to protect the nation as a whole.  The primary way in which the 
government treats terrorism risk is through proactive measures.  One of the challenges that 
the government faces is finding the balance between counter-terrorism attempts and 
emergency management.  Governments must take policy measures to prevent terrorism, but 
they should resist contributing to institutionalized fear.  Governments should prepare policy 
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measures for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery for these hazards.  While these 
operations are essential, insurers have difficulties in incorporating these measures into the 
modeling process. 
While it is difficult to approach terrorism risk in a way that identifies the frequency 
and severity of terrorist events, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attempts 
to identify and analyze the risk through a qualitative approach.  In the absence of sound risk 
assessment methods, the prioritization of homeland security activities at the federal, state, 
and local level is problematic.  DHS’s primary mission is to assess risk in an accurate 
manner, analyzing the threats that exist.  Utilizing a color-coded warning system, DHS 
classifies the current threat level at any given time.  Similar to a risk map used in the risk 
management process, this warning system analyzes the current intensity levels, indicating 
which governmental actions need to be taken.  Threat levels are classified as: 1) severe, 2) 
high, 3) elevated, 4) guarded, and 5) low.  This method is particularly useful for 
understanding, analyzing, and assessing the current threat level that the United States faces.  
Additionally, this method highlights the differing nature of terrorism from other catastrophic 
risks, considering the plans and procedures in place for governmental intervention.  
Regardless of the viewpoint on terrorism, the government and insurers have challenges in 
appropriately assessing the risk and using a risk management approach in the allocation of 
resources to treat the exposures. 
 
   c.  Quantification Methods 
 From a technical standpoint, insurers face challenges when quantifying and 
measuring terrorism risk to model it appropriately.  The risk landscape resulting from the 
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events of September 11th radically changed and created problems for insurers in the risk 
assessment process.  However, the first and most important step is understanding the 
insurer’s role in this process.  “For terrorism as with natural hazards, a catastrophe risk 
analyst’s task is to assess the likelihood of an event occurring, not to predict, let alone 
prevent, an event” (“Quantifying U.S. Terrorism Risk”).  Insurers must use methods to 
evaluate the risk being insured, subject to constraints in this process.   
Through analysis, we understand the problems that insurers face.  “The events of 11 
September have shown that people, rather than nature, pose the biggest risks, and that it is 
necessary to consider the maximum imaginable loss, not just the maximum possible loss” 
(Stahel, 2003).  In considering the extent of these losses, risk modeling can be used to assess 
the risk for rating purposes.  “RMS’ industry-leading terrorism model simulates over 90,000 
large-scale terrorist attacks across 9,800 global targets using 35 different attack types” 
(“Quantifying U.S. Terrorism Risk”).  Models such as this are not, however, perfect by any 
means.  In fact, there are several issues inherent to these models due to the nature of 
terrorism risk.   
In addition to the issues stated previously, other issues include: 1) the inability to 
model human behavior, 2) the restricted access to classified information, and 3) pricing with 
precision and accuracy.  The first issue is based on the premise that it is virtually impossible 
to model human behavior.  In economic models such as RMS, the assumption is made that 
terrorists will seek to maximize loss subject to security constraints.  In theory, this approach 
views terrorists in a way that determines that they will make a rational decision.  
Psychologically speaking, terrorists are not logical and rational beings.  Rather, they are 
unpredictable and difficult to understand.  Attempting to predict and model behavior is not 
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only inefficient, but it is also unnecessary.  Government officials, at a tactical level, should 
be responsible for dealing with this threat.   
Another issue involves the inability to access classified information.  This issue 
greatly restricts insurers’ ability to assess the likelihood of terrorist attacks.  Classified 
information and other highly sensitive data are not available to predict the next terrorist 
event.  While insurers attempt to assess the likelihood of these events occurring, it is the 
government’s duty to predict the next events.  In this role, the government engages in 
counter-terrorism attempts.  With regards to quantifying terrorism risk in a matter that 
incorporates the government’s counter-terrorism operations, game theory analysis can be 
used.  In its most simple form, game theory analysis looks at the uncertainty in the decision-
making process, identifying the possibilities in conflict situations.  This is particularly 
important with terrorism risk due to the nature of terrorists seeking to maximize loss, subject 
to security constraints.  “Current application of methods of Game Theory in study of 
terrorism include:  evaluation of strategy how nations allocate funds to combat terrorism and 
how they deal with situations after the attack, assessment of risks associated with terrorism, 
determines whether state policy of not negotiating with terrorists discourage these activities” 
(Fuka, Obrsalova, and Langasek, 2012).  While the government can benefit from analyzing 
game theory tactics and responding in the most appropriate manner, insurers are unable to 
incorporate this and other classified information as underwriting data. 
    
   d.  Rating & Evaluation  
The inability to accurately model terrorism risk creates challenges for evaluating the 
financial solvency of insurance carriers that underwrite this risk.  As previously stated, 
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insurers are required to offer this coverage and should then be assessed by rating agencies to 
evaluate the financial strength.  A.M. Best released a report stating the challenges in their 
assessment of this issue.  Insurers’ risk profiles are assessed through stress tests, looking at 
the impact of losses on their financial statements and overall solvency levels.  Various 
approaches are used depending on the aspect with which the insurer is assessed.  For 
example, reinsurers and primary insurers must be assessed in a way that accurately projects 
the overall risk level.  Additionally, differences due to the trigger of TRIA’s federal backstop 
alters the evaluation of carriers (Draft:  The Treatment of Terrorism Risk in the Rating 
Evaluation, 2015).  Overall, the level of detail needed to truly assess insurer’s financial 
strength is limited to the scope with which terrorism risk can be modeled and evaluated.   
In evaluating insurers for solvency standards and other metrics, issues become 
apparent with the imposition of requirements.  In the London market, syndicates share a 
proportional amount of exposure to loss.  Lloyd’s is one of the primary markets to insure 
complex risks, and terrorism is often covered here.  To ensure the impact of terrorist events 
will be spread amongst syndicates as to not disrupt the market, Lloyd’s maintains a set of 
mandatory Realistic Disaster Scenarios (RDS) to stress test both individual syndicates and 
the market as a whole (“RMS Terrorism Solutions”).  The event scenarios are regularly 
reviewed to ensure they represent material catastrophe risks.  One of the primary measures 
that RDS looks at is exposure accumulation.  “One problem insurers face is the accumulation 
of risk.  They need to know not only the likelihood and extent of damage to a particular 
building but also the company’s accumulated risk from insuring multiple buildings within a 
given geographical area, including the implications of fire following a terrorist attack” 
(“Terrorism Risk & Insurance”).  Blast zone radiuses are mapped by insured locations to 
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determine what the aggregate exposure of any one syndicate is.  While this may be useful, 
there are inherent issues.    The measurement is superficial because it only takes exposure 
accumulation into effect.  Until regulation changes, syndicates and the London market will 
continue to be assessed using this and other measures.  
 
III. The Future of the Industry 
   a. Public Policy Approaches 
The future of managing terrorism risk is still uncertain, especially regarding the 
government’s role.  Concernign market failures in the insurance industry, there are 
essentially three approaches to public policy:  1) laissez-fare policy, 2) public interest theory, 
and 3) market-enhancing view.  Laissez-faire public policy views limited government 
intervention as optimal due to the belief that a market-based equilibrium will provide the 
most efficient allocation of resources.  Oppositely, the public interest theory of regulation 
suggests that, in the existence of market failures, the government can and will provide 
solutions for the overall economy.  Proponents of this theory suggest that the government 
should, essentially, complete the terrorism insurance market. Lastly, the market-enhancing 
view takes a position between the other two approaches.  In this view, the belief is that public 
policy should facilitate the development of the private market, such as by improving 
information flows, but should not create new federal institutions to substitute for private 
solutions (Brown, Cummins, Lewis, and Wei, 2004).  Despite differing opinions on this 
matter, the most optimal approach will be dependent on changing legislation and the 
existence of market failures, monitoring the implemented risk management techniques to 
determine if changes need to be implemented. 
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   b.  Opportunities 
From an operational standpoint, the insurance industry faces numerous challenges in 
the treatment of terrorism risk.  The future of managing terrorism risk is hinged on 
uncertainty, raising concerns regarding the current model in place to handle terrorist events.  
Principally, there are two options that exist with regard to providing solutions to this ever-
changing problem.  The first involves the continued model through government intervention, 
providing a federal backstop to the industry.  Secondly, insurers with interest in insuring 
terrorism risk can move towards a privatized industry.  The question remains on what 
constitutes the most viable option that can be easily implemented and is inherently 
sustainable from an economic stance.  Regardless of which solution will be used in the 
future, the government and insurers must collaborate to minimize effects of threats and 
capture the opportunities. 
The first solution is perhaps the most viable in scope due to the smaller changes that 
need to take place for implementation.  The subsidized insurer model through public-private 
partnerships that is currently in place is necessary due to the government’s involvement in 
terrorism risk.  Changes can, however, be implemented that will provide for a more stable 
environment with which to handle terrorism risk.  Since the government is unable to release 
classified information, one solution could be the inclusion of this information solely for the 
purposes of modeling efforts.  For example, private insurers use public and historical data to 
assess the likelihood of a loss but need additional data to finish the model.  The government 
could act by establishing its own modeling tool using classified data to assist private insurers 
in more accurately rating and pricing the risk being insured.  This is an interest for both 
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parties if the government continues to act as a federal backstop to insuring losses of terrorist 
acts, subject to certain requirements.  
The second solution to the problem is the privatization of the industry and eliminating 
or reducing the government’s role in terrorism risk.  If there is a realistic possibility for 
insurance carriers to underwrite terrorism risk profitably, this would be the idealistic 
situation.  The E & S industry typically underwrites unique risks without much historical 
data, capturing the opportunities that the admitted market is not able to or willing to take.  
Additionally, insurers in this market enjoy the freedom of rate and form, not being restricted 
by ISO forms or pricing techniques.  However, as previously discussed, there are certain 
barriers that exist which prevent carriers to model terrorism risk.  Although this possibility 
remains, it is difficult to understand how this would be accomplished given the issues and the 
unique nature of terrorism.   
With respect to private markets, companies have various constraints in insuring 
terrorism risk.  For example, companies have a finite amount of capital and reserves and, in 
order to maintain sufficient capital for CAT losses, costs can be substantial due to tax and 
accounting constraints.  However, according to Jaffee and Russell, “with respect to the 
insurability of catastrophe risk, when these risks are free to be priced to yield a reasonable 
profit, and assuming that creative financial engineers can find ways to raise the capital 
necessary to fund losses, there is no obvious reason why private insurance markets should 
not be able to provide this product” (Jaffee, 2005).  This is why there is tremendous 
opportunity in the E & S industry to handle this risk.   
In addition to these opportunities, there may be potential in the capital markets.  
However, there are several factors preventing financial instruments such as terrorism bonds 
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from having a share of the risk (Woo).  Much of the concern with terrorism risk insurance is 
similar, but there are three main reasons why investors will not invest in terrorism bonds.  
The reasons include, 1) the correlation between terrorism and equity markets, 2) greater 
potential for adverse selection, and 3) reluctance of rating agencies to rate these bonds 
(Sclafane, 2013).  Financial markets are highly sensitive to terrorist events and investors are 
unwilling to take this risk because the return needed to justify the cost is unlikely to be 
profitable.  In addition, those seeking terrorism bonds would likely be the ones who need it 
the most, alluding to the issue of adverse selection.  While rating agencies have been 
unwilling to look at rating terrorism bonds, Standard & Poor’s released a report last year 
stating that it is open to rating new risks that could be covered using insurance-linked 
securities.  “If some method could be devised to sensibly structure cat bond or ILS type 
instruments to transfer the risks of property damages from terror attacks to the capital 
markets as well, we could get some way towards a privately supported terrorism reinsurance 
backstop” (ILS Forum, 2014).  
For the market to become fully privatized and functional in underwriting, necessary 
changes would need to occur that are not likely to happen.  Information sharing between 
governmental agencies and insurance underwriters would need to take place to begin 
modeling terrorism risk more accurately, considering external factors such as counter-
terrorism operations and classified information.  Recently, the government announced the 
establishment of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center in an effort to assist 
businesses with cyber crime.  Shortly thereafter, “the Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015, S. 
456, which is aimed at removing barriers in order to increase the sharing of cyber threat data 
between private industry and the federal government,” was enacted (U.S. Needs to Construct 
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National Cyber Security Policy, 2015).  This provides insight into the future of managing 
terrorism risk if such initiatives take place to increase the sharing of data between the 
government and private insurers.  This will greatly increase insurers’ ability to understand 
terrorism risk and model it accordingly, considering externalities such as counter-terrorism 
operations. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The insurance industry as a whole must address the issues inherent in managing 
terrorism risk, opting for solutions that are economically sustainable for the future.  
“Questions remain as to whether the private markets have developed to the point of offering 
terrorism insurance to all willing to purchase it; whether the cost of such coverage would be 
affordable; and, whether the private insurance industry would have sufficient capital 
available to withstand the potentially most catastrophic terrorist attacks” (Roberts, 2009).  
The private market for terrorism insurance, especially the E & S industry, has great potential 
to profitably underwrite this risk, eliminating the need for the government acting as the 
“insurer of last resort.”  “On the other hand, even if private insurers and reinsurers develop 
instruments to cope with a $100b loss, it is unreasonable to suppose that the loss itself will 
not be disruptive” (Jaffee and Russell, 2005).  Despite insurability issues inherent with 
terrorism risk, opportunities exist in the private markets.  If the government is willing and 
able to provide insight into its counter-terrorism operations, there may be a possibility for the 
industry to become fully privatized.   
Regardless of the model used in managing terrorism risk, collaboration will be 
needed for insurers to assess the likelihood of an event in conjunction with the government 
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using mitigation strategies to thwart potential attacks.  As stated before, there is much debate 
over the three theories of economic public policy regarding the most optimal approach.  
However, the government can and should support the private market for terrorism insurance 
without placing unnecessary restrictions that would otherwise create additional challenges in 
the pursuit of managing this incredibly complex risk. 
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